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A Big Stick, an Equally Big Carrot
Hannah Fishman
October 7, 11
Professor Andrew Latham
POLI-220- Chinese Foreign Policy
What will be the systemic consequences of China’s rise?
There is much speculation within the international community regarding
China’s newfound assertiveness and the potential threat it could pose to the current
balance of powers. Since scholars suspect China will reach its demographic potential
within in the next twenty years, policy experts are tasked with the urgent question
of the systemic consequences of China’s rise. Few dispute that China is in fact
rising—a rise that many officials and state leaders believe to be inevitable. Indeed,
this paper will not debate claims on whether China is or isn’t rising—there are too
many political, economic, and social measures that clearly favor the rising China
argument to regress into that discussion. However, the consequences of China’s rise
remain uncertain and at the forefront of international debate. While many countries
and experts fall into the slippery slope of “crystal ball” guessing games regarding
China’s assertiveness, it is nonetheless important to analyze the systemic
consequences of China’s rise as a means of offering more focused and detailed policy
recommendations for the future. In order to understand the implications of China’s
rise and the potential impact these might have on the political landscape, it is
necessary to answer three questions: what does china’s rise look like? What is
China’s trajectory and does this constitute a threat? And finally, what policies best
respond to these realities?
In this paper I will argue that China’s rise in power is guided by a policy I call
“building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.” This twofold policy seeks to increase
1
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both hard and soft power, which combined creates a system of incentives while also
deterring actors through military might. By understanding Chinese current foreign
policy strategy as it relates to Beijing’s global rise, we can better evaluate whether
China will use its position to pursue a policy of global domination or, alternatively,
assume its position as a “good institutional citizen” within the liberal international
system. Policy recommendations will be aimed at guiding China to assume the latter
position and I argue that strengthening Western-central international institutions
can accomplish this best.
Much of the concern regarding Chinese assertiveness stems from China’s
growing ability to project power. The past couple decades have witnessed a steady
increase in Chinese hard and soft power—perhaps both intentionally and
unintentionally. The result is what I would call a “building a bigger stick and a bigger
carrot” foreign policy. To this point, China is not only building up its tangible
military and economic power but also strengthening its soft power appeal by
growing its capacity to influence others. The “building a bigger stick and a bigger
carrot” approach positions China at the center of strategic alliances held together by
a program of incentives and deterrence. By examining the ways in which China
pursues a “building a bigger stick and bigger carrot” plan, policy makers can better
tailor a foreign policy strategy that incorporates and responds to Chinese hard and
soft power realities.
In the last two decades China embarked on a conspicuous program of
military modernization. Military modernization should not come as a surprise or as
a threat necessarily—“China is still decades away from challenging U.S. military’s
2
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preeminence…[and has] significant shortcomings in command and control, air
defense, logistics, and communications”1. China recognizes that its current military
lacks the sufficient strength and sophistication to fight a major war outside of
China’s coasts and, thus, has dedicated itself to building a military capable of
defending its core interests.
China’s growth in military currently appears benign as long as it remains
within the framework of defending core interests; however, there is much concern
and anxiety among policy officials and analysts who worry that a military buildup
might pose a more bellicose threat in the future. These are not unreasonable
concerns for a few reasons. First, the most conspicuous indication of Chinese
military modernization is its 2008 defense budget of $61 billion. The U.S. Defense
Department believes Chinese military spending to be even higher than this estimate
since in 2007 the Chinese reported a budget $52 billion, whereas the Defense
Department estimated a spending range between $97 and $139 billion2. Beijing’s
increased spending funded “a large, increasingly capable submarine fleet, and air
force stocked with Russian warplanes, and technical strides which have improved
China’s ballistic missile arsenal”3. China recently announced its commitment to
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deploy an aircraft carrier force in a move to build its “blue water” navy capacities4.
China is currently the only veto power on the Security Council without an aircraft
carrier, and thus this measure to modernize the navy may simply be “a symbol of
China’s great-power status”5. However, many U.S. officials remain suspicious of
China’s intentions and believe China’s motivation to modernize its navy is more
complicated than a power-play with fellow Security Council countries.
As China increases its military might, it is important to consider Beijing’s
predisposition for defense and no-first-attack policy. While “building a big stick”
may be important for deterrence, it is equally important for China to “build a big
carrot” in order to create incentives that persuade states to act in ways favorable to
China. References to American soft power often speak to forms of cultural capital—
perhaps the ubiquity of McDonalds or the proliferation and appeal of Hollywood.
This is a somewhat narrow definition of soft power— one that doesn’t resemble
China’s type of growing soft power. As a definition, soft power “refers to a nation
winning influence abroad by persuasion and appeal rather than by threats or
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James Holmes, “Blue Water Dreams,” Foreign Policy, 27 June 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/blue_water_dreams 1.
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military force”6. This can include “a country’s culture, political values, foreign
policies, and economic attraction”7.
China’s most powerful and growing form of soft power is its relationships
with African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries. These relationships
build on political and economic cooperation and entanglement that emphasize
“mutual interests” through development, resource sharing, and technical support.
Unlike the Western or American model, China’s soft power appeal stems from its
“no string attached” approach that doesn’t does believe that political or military
reform are necessary compliments to development. Beijing’s acceptance of many
paths to development poses a stark contrast to American engagement and
diplomacy. The conspicuous influx of Chinese doctors, Chinese construction
managers, and Chinese teachers in foreign countries manifests the broad influence
and reach of Chinese soft power. Whether consciously or subconsciously, these
forms of engagement engender a greater fascination with Chinese culture and
further promulgate Chinese influence abroad.
China’s increase in hard and soft power is undeniable and China’s rise can be
defined best as a program aimed at “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.”
Before examining the systemic consequences of this rise, it is important to first
evaluate whether this hyper-stick and carrot approach could prove powerful
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Ester Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 May
2006. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715 1.

7
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enough to pose a systemic threat. This analysis is necessary since there are limits to
both China’s hard and soft power that could restrict China from posing a existential
challenge. In the case of soft power, many policy officials question how far Chinese
“soft” influence can extend if Beijing remains an undemocratic power. First, China’s
domestic disorder best exposes its undemocratic policies, and allied-countries “see
that China suffers from endemic corruption, internal dissent and repressive
governance”8. Second, Beijing’s policy of “see no evil,” which allows China to turn a
blind eye to partner countries’ troubles of political unrest and tyranny, greatly
tarnishes Beijing’s soft power. And finally, security-related measurements continue
to define much of China’s contemporary influence, which emphasizes the ceilings to
China’s soft power unless it adopts democratic principles9. In regards to hard power,
Chinese capabilities remain equally limited. Currently China’s military
modernization proves more symbolic than threatening—Beijing’s simplistic
capacities lack a real ability to defend. That China acquires one aircraft carrier
means little to the United States since it poses no current threat to the United States’
sophisticated blue water navy. Because of China’s unsustainable practices and
tangible limits to its soft and hard power, China’s rise may not have systemic
consequences. However, this paper will proceed by evaluating the possibility of
China’s rise having systemic ramifications.
The consequences of Beijing’s “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot”
policy will be dependent on the weight given to this two-pronged policy. Beijing
8

Ester Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 May
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now has the choice of pursuing a “big stick” policy, a “big carrot” strategy, or some
combination of both. Regardless of which direction China heads, what remains true
for all scenarios is the dramatic impact each will have on the global community and
international order. I offer my speculations regarding the consequences of the most
extreme directions of China’s rise and then suggest the best policies for the United
States to pursue in order to prevent such materializations.
If China decides to pursue a “big stick” policy in the future, it’s motivation
would likely stem from the desire to deny U.S. access to Southeast Asian waters,
shape geostrategic realities in the region to align with Chinese interests, and compel
neighbors to accept Chinese regional hegemony. This type of grand strategy doesn’t
necessarily indicate that China will use its “big stick,” but it does suggest a more
assertive China willing to showcase its military might through coercive deterrence.
The results would be twofold. First, through coercive deterrence China would have
the means to “wield a club” of countries that unconditionally support Beijing’s
decisions. This would resemble contemporary U.S. alliances and relationships that
are built on military needs and protection. This, however, raises the concern that if
China’s “club” directly opposed the U.S. “club” that the ramifications would be a Cold
War like bloc system, with each club competing for neutral states’ support. The
second consequence also resembles the Cold War landscape, an environment where
“building the big stick” results in a quasi-arms race. A Chinese increase its military
strength would likely compel the United States to do so as well, producing a pattern
of action, counteraction, and counter-counteraction. Both country’s need to project
power in unconventional ways could result in the weaponization of space. While
7
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these are all speculations, if China decides to use the “big stick” component of its
current rise, the systemic consequences are troublingly similar to the Cold War
period—an epoch that the international community should not rush to recreate.
Thus, U.S. policy towards China’s rise should aim to shape Chinese thinking about its
military future by integrating it into the international system that provides its own
“club,” therefore reducing the need for China to wield its own club.
An alternative policy would be one that emphasizes China’s “big carrot”
strategy. This would proliferate the “Beijing Consensus” and similarly build a
coalition of states easily persuaded by China’s soft power politics. As China
continues to expand its influence across the global through its “no strings attached
policy,” Beijing’s disregard for state political unrest, oppression, and governmental
tyranny would likely produce a “dictators club.” China’s engagement in the Middle
East, African, and Latin America seemingly “fills the gaps” where the United States
has not been willing to involve itself to due ideological disparities. By aligning itself
with Ahmadinejad and al-Bashir, China makes a conscious decision to sideswipe the
West and create its own alliance of powers. Similar to the consequences of a hard
power strategy, the resulting political landscape would likely resemble the Cold
War’s unstable bloc system. A soft power approach appears as dismal a
consequence as a hard power strategy, and thus U.S policies must harness the
productive functions of Chinese soft power in order to dissuade Beijing from
building a “dictators’ club” willing to challenge U.S. interest.
These two strategies manifest the most extreme and bleak systemic
outcomes of China’s rise. The examples of a “big stick” or “big carrot” approach
8
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assume that a rising China will be interested in global hegemony and countering
American influence and power. However, “China’s rise can be peaceful, but this
outcome is far from guaranteed”10. It is not too late for contemporary U.S. foreign
policy toward Beijing to guide and ensure a benign Chinese rise. First, the United
States must accept the fact that China is “building a bigger stick and a bigger
carrot”—I see no policy measures that could interrupt Chinese modernization and
global reach, and therefore the U.S. must focus its policies around this reality. With
this in mind, I defend John Ikenberry’s recommendation, which believe that by
strengthening Western, liberal institutions, China “can gain full access to and thrive
within the system. And if it does, China will rise, but Western order—if managed
properly—will live on”11. If the United States attempts to reinvigorate the
international order with western, liberal ideals, both China’s hard and soft power
will find a place within this framework as a good institutional citizen. Beijing’s
modernizing military could be harnessed for humanitarian purposes, rescue
missions, and international security. Likewise, China’s soft power pursuits could be
incorporated into international development agencies and multilateral institutions,
perhaps even with the opportunity to offer its “no strings attached” as a reform
model. Through integration into modern system of global governance, China will
reap the benefits of policies of goodwill and likely be steered towards a democratic
path. If China wishes to resemble the other four veto powers on the Security Council,
10

Charles Glaser, 2011, "Will china's rise lead to war? Why realism does not mean
pessimism", Foreign Affairs. 90 (2), 7.
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G.J. Ikenberry, 2008, "The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal
system survive?" Foreign Affairs, 87 (1): 1
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it must go beyond just building a blue water navy and aircraft carrier, since being a
world power means assuming global responsibility and using your big stick and big
carrot for international stability.
China is undeniably on the rise—the past decades witnessed a stark increase
in China’s tangible military and economic power as well as its global recognition and
persuasion. Beijing’s amplification of both hard and soft power projects can be
characterized by a policy I refer to as “building a bigger stick and a bigger carrot.”
This strategy combines incentives with deterrence in a way that makes partnership
with Beijing both strategic and threatening. Since China won’t realistically challenge
the United States’ capabilities or influence for another twenty years, U.S. policy
officials have time to formulate a strategy that guides China’s hard and soft into a
framework of liberal international institutions. The only way to do so will be by
strengthening the Western-centered system of international governance. While it
may be difficult to persuade Americans experts to lessen the microscope on China,
only through focused attention to reviving the Western order will China’s rise be
benign, if not beneficial to the international system.
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